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INTRODUCTION
The United States prides itself on valuing the importance of schooling and education.
While there are many variations of schooling in our society today, Americans heavily rely on
public schools to ensure their children receive a quality education.1 Most people can agree that a
major role of our local, state, and federal governments is to provide a “free” and effective
education—though much of our taxes go towards funding public schools. Moreover, unlike other
types of schools, such as private and charter, that can discriminate on the basis of wealth or
intellectual abilities, public schools educate students of all different ethnicities, economic statuses,
and religions. Therefore, public schools should be inclusive institutions for all students, in order
for everyone to feel welcomed and be able to learn. However, since the twentieth century, religion
and public schools have frequently been in tension.
In general, the Constitution clearly sets out the role of religion in our country through the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment which state, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”2 As a result, it is established
principle that public schools cannot teach about religion in a devotional way without violating the
Establishment Clause. However, while our governments have consistently ensured public schools
do not promote religion, the opposite cannot be found true as well. In other words, school
curriculums have increasingly been including, or even mandating, certain topics be taught which
are in clear violation of many students’ faiths. In fact, some of these topics may offend parents and
students of little or no faith as well, simply because they push for a certain belief which might be
contrary to personal viewpoints. Two common topics in this area include teaching about the LGBT
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movement and evolution science. These topics pose a problem in public school curriculums
because they send a certain message to children, namely that the LGBT movement should be
accepted and that the universe started in a particular way. Thus, it is important to note that not all
controversial topics present this same problem. For example, many may consider sex education to
also violate some beliefs; however if public schools simply inform students that if they choose to
engage in certain activities they should learn how to mitigate subsequent consequences, then the
school has not endorsed a certain belief.3
In our ever pluralistic society, many topics can run counter to different types of religions.
While public schools cannot realistically cater to every single belief in classroom curriculums,
focusing on topics that are largely and historical known to be in direct violation of many religious
beliefs should not be taught. In the same vein of neutrality, topics on religion, albeit taught in a
non-devotional way, should not be included in public school curriculums either. The cases will
show that even when schools attempt to impartially teach about different religions, some will argue
the fine line between devotional and non-devotional teaching has been crossed. Therefore, a
common theme to draw from cases in this space can be that both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause may be violated when religious or anti-religious views are taught in public
schools. Plaintiffs in these suits range from parents claiming their Free Exercise right has been
violated if they feel their beliefs have not been respected, or conversely, parents claiming the
Establishment Clause has been violated if they believe a school is advancing a certain religious
viewpoint that undermines their children’s alternative belief or lack thereof. Therefore, this paper
proposes that in order for public schools to be an inclusive place for all students, they should refrain
from teaching controversial topics that could offend either religious or non-religious students.
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to seek opt-outs for their children. Opt-outs will be discussed in Section III of this paper.
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This paper is organized as follows: Section I describes new laws that mandate LGBT
curriculums. Section II provides the constitutional framework of parental rights to their children’s
upbringing as well as tests the Court uses to determine whether a violation of the Religion Clauses
occurs. Section III will then discuss accommodations the Court has opined about over the years,
such as opt-outs, as a remedy for these curriculums. Finally, Section IV will analyze voucher
programs as a unique approach to accommodations as well as provide some other thoughts moving
forward.
SECTION I: NEW LAWS AFFECTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUMS
In recent years, some state legislatures have heavily focused on including LGBT teachings
in their public school curriculums. Currently, six states actually mandate these teachings:
California, New Jersey, Colorado, Oregon, Illinois, and Nevada. 4 California became the first state
to require this reworked school curriculum through the FAIR Education Act passed in 2011,5
which seeks to include a study of “the role and contributions” of LGBT Americans, among other
minority groups.6 As a result of this Act, teachers began using new textbooks that furthered this
goal starting in the 2017-2018 school year.7 Interestingly, the Act prohibits schools from “adopting
instructional materials that contain any matter reflecting adversely upon persons” because of their
religion, among other factors.8 Yet, at the same time, the revised curriculums set out to educate
children from as young as kindergarten about LGBT familial structures, while ensuring older
students learn about LGBT figures and history. 9 Since then, the remaining states followed

Sabia Prescott, Six states have now passed LGBTQ+ inclusive curriculum legislation —each with a different
definition of ‘inclusion,’ NEW AMERICA (June 17, 2021), https://www.newamerica.org/education policy/edcentral/six-states-have-now-passed-lgbtq-inclusive-curriculum-legislationeach-with-a-different-definitionof-inclusion/.
5 Id.
6 Los Angeles County Office of Education, About the FAIR Education Act, https://www.lacoe.edu/Curriculum Instruction/History-Social-Science/FAIR-Act.
7 Prescott, supra note 3, at 3.
8 FAIR Education Act
9 Prescott, supra note 3, at 3.
4
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California’s lead in requiring these curriculums, but have called for variations among them. For
instance, in Colorado, school boards may receive state funding for these new textbooks and in
Illinois, a coalition called the “Illinois Inclusive Curriculum Advisory Council” formed to
determine curriculum content.10
In 2019, New Jersey became the second state to mandate LGBT-inclusive curriculums and
required this change to “take effect immediately” in the 2020-2021 school year through New Jersey
S1569.11 However, unlike California or Colorado which only require LGBT implementation in
social sciences and history courses, New Jersey became the first state to mandate the curriculum
in all subjects.12 The legislation seeks to teach “the political, economic, and social contributions”
of LGBT figures to middle and high school students.13 Moreover, in just March of this year, the
state legislature also enacted New Jersey A4454, which seeks to highlight and promote tolerance
“in connection with gender and sexual orientation,” in all subject areas starting from
kindergarten.14 While some state representatives felt more comfortable allowing older students to
learn from this curriculum, they were more opposed to teaching younger students these topics. 15
New Jersey S1569 passed partly due to the advocacy of a group called Garden State
Equality (GSE), which then launched a pilot program in the beginning of 2020 to prepare for the
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N.J. Stat. § 18A:35-4.35.
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2020-2021 curriculum changes.16 In developing the program, GSE created lesson plans for grades
spanning from fifth to twelfth so that curriculums would be ready for the start of the school year.17
A GSE spokesperson expressed that he hoped the program would not face delays like those which
occurred after California passed its Act in 2011, but there, the curriculum “has not been fully
implemented” due to opposition from conservative parents. 18 Similarly, New Jersey has also faced
pushback from conservative groups and parents who have sought accommodations in response to
these two laws. This paper will return to those accommodations in Section IV.
SECTION II: CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Court has emphasized the right for parents to raise their children as they each see fit
over the government’s interests throughout the twentieth century. However, the cases will show
that while parental rights to their children’s upbringing are protected, they face limitations in public
schools. These limitations often clash with parents bringing both Free Exercise claims because
they believe certain teachings violate their religious faiths, as well as parents bringing
Establishment Clause claims because they feel certain teachings are enforcing faiths contrary to
their own. Thus, the common theme to take away from the following cases is that regardless of
whether students and their families are devoutly religious to a particular creed, not religious at all,
or fall somewhere in between, they all believe public schools should not interfere with their
approach to childrearing.
a. Parental Rights Cases
Meyer v. Nebraska became one of the earliest and most influential cases where the Court

Melanie Burney, LGBTQ education is now mandatory in N.J. schools. Here’s how teachers are preparing , THE
PHILADELPHIA I NQUIRER, (January 20, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/education/nj-lgbtq-educa tion-curriculumlesson-plans-mandate-20200120.html.
17 Id.
18 Id.
16
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establishes parental authority over childhood education in 1923. There, a teacher was convicted
for violating a state statute that prohibited teaching students any subject in a language other than
English unless they passed the eighth grade.19 Although the state sought to discourage immigrants
from growing their foreign presence by ensuring school-aged children learn in English until “it
had become a part of them,”20 the Court held “the legislature ha[d] attempted materially to interfere
. . . with the power of parents to control the education of their own.” 21 It reasoned that the right to
raise children constituted a liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment just as the right to
marry and the right to worship God according to each individual’s conscience. 22 As a result, the
Court reversed the decision below because the state’s interest in promoting American patriotism
did not supersede the parents’ right in so choosing to promote their children’s education through
learning foreign languages.23
Less than two years after the Meyer decision, the Court opined on another case involving
an Act interfering with parental rights in education, not in deciding what children can learn but
rather where children can learn, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. There, Oregon enacted the
Compulsory Education Act which required parents to send their children to public school or else
be charged with a misdemeanor.24 The Act purportedly sought “to compel general attendance” for
students,25 and as a result, parents began to quickly pull out their children from private schools for
fear of being criminally charged.26 Two private corporations brought suit due to decreased
enrollment and loss of profitability: the Society of Sisters, which provided both religious and
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Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
Id. at 396.
21 Id. at 401.
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26 Id. at 532.
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secular education as well as care for orphans, and a military academy, which offered both academic
and military training for males from ages five to twenty-one.27 Although these corporations had
very different missions and approaches towards education, they both offered an education
comparable to that offered in public schools. 28 As a result, the harm the Compulsory Education
Act sought to mitigate did not pose a threat for the children attending these private schools.
While the private schools brought this suit because of the Act’s interference with their
institutions, the Court looked to its decision in Meyer in reasoning that the Act “unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”29 Notably, the Court in Pierce further stated that “[t]he child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” 30 As a result, the
Court affirmed the decision below, holding the state could not threaten the private schools with
enforcing the arbitrary Act.
Fast forwarding to 1972, the Court decided another case in the realm of restricted
education, but this time, it focused heavily on the parents’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause
in addition to the substantive due process reasoning of Meyer and Pierce. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,
an Amish community brought suit arguing the state’s compulsory school attendance policy
violated their religious way of life, as guaranteed to them under the Free Exercise Clause. The law
required children to attend either public or private school until at least the age of sixteen, but the
respondents refused to send their children to any school after the eighth grade because a high
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school environment would go against their way of life, regardless of where the education t ook
place.31
Like in Pierce, the Wisconsin law intended to ensure children attend school so they could
later become productive members of society. On these facts alone, one might argue that while the
state did not have a strong claim for the law in Pierce, since the private school students attended
schools that offered an analogous education to that of public schools, the state in Yoder did have a
strong claim, since the Amish students did not attend any school to receive a secondary level
education. While one may wonder why the Court did not compel the Amish children to attend high
school in a religious institution or be home-schooled to reach a compromise between the two
parties’ interests, the Court instead focused on the preserved Amish tradition of being a self-reliant
community through the practical skills the children continue to learn.
Relying on both Meyer and Pierce, the Court stated that “the values of parental direction
of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have
a high place in our society.”32 It further reasoned that “a State's interest in universal education,
however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on
fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment.”33 Overall, while subsequent cases will display the limitations to the
parental rights of child upbringing, Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder established that fundamental liberty
which many today argue must be emphasized more against controversial curriculums state
legislatures continue to impose.
Yoder became not only a fundamental parental rights decision, but also a significant Free
Exercise Clause decision as well. Pointing to the influential case of Sherbert v. Verner, the Court
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stated, “A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion.”34 In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist Church member was discharged by her
employer for failing to work on Saturdays, “the Sabbath Day of her faith.”35 When she then filed
for unemployment benefits, the South Carolina Employment Security Commission found that the
plaintiff restricted herself in accepting available work, thus disqualifying her from receiving
benefits. Just like the Court in Sherbert found that the decision of the Commission forced the
plaintiff “to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand,”36 the Court in Yoder found that the compulsory school attendance policy forced the Amish
to “either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some
other and more tolerant region.”37
Sherbert established the rule that “governmental actions that substantially burden a
religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.” 38 This strict scrutiny
standard of review meant that even generally applicable laws that do not seek to target religious
views can still pose a Constitutional violation. The “Sherbert test” remained the operative standard
until the 1990 decision of Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. There,
members of the Native American Church were fired from their jobs because they ingested peyote
for sacramental purposes.39 When they then applied for unemployment compensation, “they were
determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related
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Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
36 Id. at 404.
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‘misconduct.’”40 While the Oregon Supreme Court found in favor of the respondents using the
reasoning of Sherbert, the United States Supreme Court established a new “Smith test,” in which
a neutral law of general applicability cannot give rise to a religious exemption.41 As a result,
religion-based exemptions received reduced protection, since the Smith test lowered the strict
scrutiny standard to rational basis review. However, if a law is not neutral or generally applicable,
strict scrutiny still applies. Currently, the Court appears to be edging towards a return to mainly
applying the Sherbert test because it has increasingly found that the contested laws before it are
not neutral laws of general applicability.42
As these cases have shown, plaintiffs claim their Free Exercise rights have been violated
when they cannot receive a religious exemption to a law that runs counter to their religious views.
Therefore, parents who claim their children’s school refuses to accommodate their religious views
when it comes to classroom curriculums will likely turn to the Free Exercise Clause in claiming a
violation. If the Court continues to move towards strict scrutiny, schools will be faced with the
difficult task of proving that their approach towards the affected students was the least restrictive
alternative to the compelling educational interest. Recent decisions like Tandon and Fulton,
though outside the educational context, lead to the conclusion that many opt-outs will be granted.
Section III of this paper will discuss opt-outs in greater detail.
b. No Devotional Exercise in Schools Cases
The 1960s began the limitation on parental control in child upbringing over school
influences. Beginning with the landmark case of Engel v. Vitale, the Court established the firm
holding that devotional prayer, even if not tied to a particular religion or sect, violates the
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Establishment Clause.43 Moreover, it did not matter that students could remain silent during the
prayer or even excuse themselves from the room; since the prayer furthered a set of beliefs, it
violated the Establishment Clause.44 However, although these decisions curtailed religious
influence for many larger, “mainstream” religions of this time, they also created more religious
freedom for those of minority faiths.45 Viewed in this way, schools were required to become more
neutral in catering to all students, whether they belonged to a large or small religion, or to no
religion at all. Nevertheless, while situations involving prayer appear to be clear-cut cases, other
teachings and activities call for a deeper analysis.
c. Evolution and Religious Theories of Science
After Charles Darwin published the monumental On the Origin of Species in 1859,
contentions began to erupt between this new idea of evolution and Biblical beliefs that God created
the universe and mankind. Although Darwin published his work in England, he quickly gained
traction in the United States. The 1870s displayed American Evangelists beginning to attack
“Darwinism” for its plain contradictions with Biblical scripture, as theories of evolution as well as
theories of human origin began to flourish following Darwin’s The Descent of Man publication in
1871.46 Largely in response to Darwinism, nineteenth century America saw the development of
the Fundamentalist movement born out of the Evangelical Protestants.47 To combat the spread of
Darwinism, Fundamentalists began “promot[ing] statutes prohibiting the teaching of evolution in
public schools.”48 For a span of about forty years until the 1960s, biology textbooks avoided
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mentioning Darwin or his theories, and conservatives succeeded in endorsing anti-evolution
thought.49
However, the 1960s saw a change not only in traditional values but also in scientific
advancement, which encouraged schools to “modernize” their science curriculums.50 Biology
classrooms saw a dramatic overhaul in curriculums, mainly in response to the 1957 launch of the
Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union.51 In an effort to remain competitive with the Soviet Union,
“the National Science Foundation funded several programs” to renovate science in the classroom. 52
Working alongside scientists and teachers, different organizations created new textbooks which
heavily focused on introducing the theory of evolution.53 In fact, by the 1980s, the Court noted
that “fifty percent of American school children currently use [the new] books directly and the
curriculum is incorporated indirectly in virtually all biology texts.” 54 In response to all of the
secular shifts away from traditional creation teachings, Fundamentalist groups coined the phrases
“creation science” and “scientific creationism” in the mid-1960s, which sought to promote the
belief that scientific data supports the Biblical book of Genesis.55 The following monumental cases
display how the Court responded to this contention in public schools.
The case of Epperson v. Arkansas became a landmark decision on evolution in public
schools. There, a young tenth grade biology teacher employed by the Little Rock school system
was presented with a new biology textbook that contained a chapter on evolution, specifically that
“man [originated] from a lower form of animal.” 56 However, Arkansas law made it “unlawful for
a teacher in any state-supported school or university ‘to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind
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ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,’ or ‘to adopt or use in any such institution
a textbook that teaches’ this theory.”57 Those who violated this law would be charged with a
misdemeanor and dismissed from their teaching position. 58 As a result, the teacher brought suit in
face of this dilemma of either teaching the condemned chapter but risking her job per state law, or
not teaching the chapter, but getting in trouble by the school administration. She sought to have
the state statute void so that she could freely teach from the new textbook without facing dismissal
or criminal charges.59 While the chancery court found the statute to be in violation of the First
Amendment, which applies to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the state has power to dictate public school curriculums. 60
The case made its way to the United States Supreme Court, in which the statute was found
to be in violation of the Religion Clauses. The Court reasoned,
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to
the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or
religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. 61
Interestingly, the Court went into a discussion of Meyer, not for its holding that parents have the
right to dictate the upbringing of their children based on what they learn in school, but rather for
the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees the right to “acquire useful knowledge.”62
Yet, even after discussing Meyer, the Court went on to state that this present case only needs to be
analyzed under the Religion Clauses, and under Engel and Schempp, Arkansas bans the teaching
of a scientific theory solely for “reasons that violate the First Amendment.” 63 Therefore, because
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the law could not be found neutral with respect to religion, the Court reversed the holding of the
Arkansas Supreme Court.
Louisiana took a different approach when handling evolution in its public schools which
the Court opined on in the 1987 case of Edwards v. Aguillard. There, the state had a “Creationism
Act” which “forb[a]de the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools unless
accompanied by instruction in ‘creation science.’"64 Notably, the state did not enforce either
theory, however if one theory was taught, the other had to be taught as well. 65 Yet, even this
seemingly fair approach in handling both theories still caused tension among some parents and
teachers. While Louisiana state officials argued that the Act served to “protect a legitimate secular
interest, namely, academic freedom,” those in opposition argued that it violated the Establishment
Clause.66 Both the district and appellate courts agreed with the opponents, in believing the Act
essentially served as a means to promote the religious belief of creationism because evolution
could not be taught on its own.67
When the case came to the Supreme Court, the Majority applied the Lemon test, which
came from the 1971 landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, to determine whether a violation of the
Establishment Clause occurred. In order to avoid a violation, a three prong test must be met: “First,
the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose. Second, the statute's principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the statute must not
result in an excessive entanglement of government with religion.”68 Notably, the Court stressed
the importance of ensuring no Establishment Clause violations occur in public schools due to the
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Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987).
Id.
66 Id. at 582.
67 The appellate court believed the “Louisiana Legislature's actual intent was ‘to discredit evolution by
counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism, a religious belief.’”
68 Id. at 583 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971)).
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impressionability of children.69 In applying the test to this case, the state officials could not even
satisfy the first prong because the Court found the secular purpose to be insincere.70 In other words,
because teachers were not confined to only teach evolution, but could rather teach about any
scientific theory anyway, the Act did not further any secular interest. While one may argue that
the Act gave both creation science and evolution equal classroom time, furthering the former could
not be considered a secular purpose. The Court reasoned:
The Creationism Act is designed either to promote the theory of creation science
which embodies a particular religious tenet by requiring that creation science be
taught whenever evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific theory
disfavored by certain religious sects by forbidding the teaching of evolution when
creation science is not also taught.71
Whether the Court correctly deciphered the true intent of all the Louisiana legislators may
never be fully known, but this case displays that even if the state intended to remain neutral in
requiring that if one creation theory was taught, the other had to be taught as well, the Court still
believed that a violation of the Establishment Clause occurred. Therefore, as I will argue in Section
IV, the best way to remain truly neutral with regards to these two controversial teachings is to
simply avoid teaching either of them. Instead, public school science teachers can focus on teaching
students all of the other uncontentious lessons within this subject that will add to their knowledge
without infringing on their First Amendment rights.72
Not long after the Edwards decision, Louisiana again found itself in federal court for
violating the Establishment Clause when dealing with evolution in its public schools. In Freiler v.
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Id. The Court stressed that not only are children impressionable in elementary and secondary levels, but their
attendance is mandated. Thus, “‘[i]n no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its
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Frankfurter, J.)).
70 Id. at 587.
71 Id. at 593.
72 Some scholars have openly acknowledged the connection between evolution and anti-religious viewpoints and
propose that the Lemon and endorsement tests should be revised in order to freely teach evolution. See Casey
Luskin, Darwin's Poisoned Tree: Atheistic Advocacy and the Constitutionality of Teaching Evolution in Public
Schools, 21 TRINITY L. REV. 130, 132 (2015).
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Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education, the school board mandated a disclaimer to be read each
time a classroom discussed evolution.73 The mandate also encouraged students to “think critically
before forming an opinion” and noted the privilege of “maintain[ing] beliefs taught by parents on
this very important matter of the origin of life and matter.” 74 Importantly, the resolution passing
the mandate warned that “the Scientific Theory of Evolution [] should be presented to inform
students of the scientific concept and not intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical version of
Creation or any other concept.”75 Although perhaps less neutral than the law in Edwards, the Board
of Education argued that this mandate did not just intend to protect Biblical teachings but also
other theories that conflict with evolution.
In determining whether a violation of the Establishment Clause occurred, the Court not
only analyzed the case under the Lemon test discussed above, but also under the two other tests
used in this realm: the endorsement test and the coercion test. The endorsement test, as the name
suggests, “seeks to determine whether the government endorses religion by means of the
challenged action.”76 “The government unconstitutionally endorses religion when it ‘conveys a
message that religion is “favored,” “preferred,” or “promoted” over other beliefs.’"77 The coercion
test, also aptly named, “analyzes school-sponsored religious activity in terms of the coercive effect
that the activity has on students.”78 The court looked to another Fifth Circuit decision to note that
school sponsored activity violates the Establishment Clause when "(1) the government directs (2)
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Freiler v. Tangipahoa Par. Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999). The Resolution passing the mandate
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a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of objectors." 79 While
there can be much overlap among these three tests, not all usually apply to a specific situation. For
instance, here, the court noted that because no pressure occurred to participate in a religious
exercise, the coercion test should not be applied. 80 Instead, it applied both the Lemon test and the
endorsement test to the facts of this case.
In applying the first prong of the Lemon test, the court explained that “a sincere secular
purpose for the contested state action must exist; even if that secular purpose is but one in a sea of
religious purposes.”81 According to the school board, the disclaimer served three purposes: “(1) to
encourage informed freedom of belief, (2) to disclaim any orthodoxy of belief that could be
inferred from the exclusive placement of evolution in the curriculum, and (3) to reduce offense to
the sensibilities and sensitivities of any student or parent caused by the teaching of evolution.”82
In finding only the latter two purposes sincere, the court went on to analyze whether those purposes
were “permissible secular objectives.”83 The court found the disclaimer valid under the first prong
of Lemon by relying on the understanding that the Supreme Court required as little as one secular
purpose for satisfaction. From here, the court moved on to the second prong, which it noted
functions like the endorsement test.84 At this point, the disclaimer violated the Establishment
Clause because it advanced religion by protecting the Biblical version of creation. 85 More
specifically, the court interpreted the mandate’s language of “exercise[ing] critical thinking . . .
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together with the explicit reference to the ‘Biblical version of Creation’ . . . urges students to think
about religious theories of ‘the origin of life and matter’ as an alternative to evolution, the Statemandated curriculum.”86 Thus, Louisiana was found to be in violation of the First Amendment yet
again.
After the Edwards decision in 1987, conservatives coined a new phrase to bolster scientific
legitimacy in their religious creation theory: intelligent design.87 In 1989, a Christian organization
published the new science textbook, Of Pandas and People, which discussed an intelligent
designer who arranged parts of the universe. 88 While this concept of intelligent design existed in
different forms over the years, the textbook did not take the official position that attributed God as
the designer.89 Nonetheless, experts argued that no other alternative to God has been proposed and
the argument of intelligent design itself has been described as a religious argument. Courts soon
began to face intelligent design as a new wrinkle to the evolution and creation science debate. The
glaring question asked whether intelligent design served as an alternative scientific theory to
evolution, or whether it constituted creationism in a new form.
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District involved a Delaware school board which passed
a resolution mandating a certain disclaimer to be made, similar to the disclaimer in Freiler. The
resolution required that “[s]tudents will be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin's theory and
of other theories of evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent design. Note: Origins of Life
is not taught.”90 Moreover, teachers were required to read a statement to ninth grade biology
students that essentially expressed that evolution was a theory and therefore not a fact, and that
“intelligent design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from Darwin’s view.”91
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Like in Freiler, the board in Kitzmiller advised students to “keep an open mind” with
respect to these concepts, and the subject of the Origins of Life should be left for students to discuss
with their families.92 The court found that the language of these statements to have violated the
Establishment Clause under both the Lemon test and endorsement test.93 In so finding, it sought to
determine “whether an ‘objective observer’ in the position of a student of the relevant age would
‘perceive official school support’ for the religious activity in question.”94 In looking at how the
phrase “intelligent design” came about as well as considering how the concept has been described
by experts in this space, the court found overwhelming evidence to classify intelligent design as a
religious argument in which the school attempted to endorse. Not only has intelligent design been
described as a religious concept due to its focus on a supernatural designer, 95 but also because the
word “creation” systematically changed to “intelligent design” right after the Edwards decision in
1987.96 Thus, the court concluded that “intelligent design is creationism re-labeled.”97
However, the court in Kitzmiller did not end its opinion there. It felt compelled to further
analyze whether intelligent design is a science at all, in hopes of “prevent[ing] the obvious waste
of judicial and other resources which would be occasioned by a subsequent trial involving the
precise question before us.”98 The court articulated that “[intelligent design] takes a natural
phenomenon and, instead of accepting or seeking a natural explanation, argues that the explanation
is supernatural.”99 Moreover, it also looked to several scientific associations as well as professors
in the field, all coming to the conclusion that intelligent design cannot be considered a science
because it is “not testable by the methods of science,” through studies and peer review. 100 After
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that lengthy discussion, the court went on to say that it “express[es] no opinion on the ultimate
veracity of [intelligent design] as a supernatural explanation,” but intelligent design “is grounded
in theology, not science.”101
Notably, the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of intelligent design.
Since Kitzmiller, some states have introduced laws that allow teachers to openly critique evolution
in science classes, by justifying the promotion of academic freedom. 102 In doing so, teachers
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of evolution, as well as discuss the scientific evidence for
creationism.103 While some propose that public schools should teach creation science to
supplement teachings of evolution,104 others continue to find that regardless of a disclaimer
encouraging critical thinking, any alternative theory criticizing evolution is religiously motivated
in violation of the Establishment Clause.
SECTION III: ACCOMMODATIONS IN CURRICULUM TO ALLOW PARENTS TO
DICTATE UPBRINGING
Largely due to the fundamental notion that parents have the right to their children’s
upbringing, parents have sought for accommodations during times when they felt their school
boards have infringed on that right. Often times, accommodations can be viewed as the
compromise between the religious objections of parents in having their children exposed to certain
material and the goals of schools to emphasize a curriculum they choose to teach their students.
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When schools allow for accommodations, both parties can have their concerns met. However, the
problem arises when school boards choose not to honor parents’ requests for accommodations for
lessons they feel contradict the beliefs they raise their children with. When accommodations are
not honored, not only do the families feel their Free Exercise claims have been disrespected, but
they are also left to make the difficult choice of either surrendering to the school’s insistence in
teaching the controversial lesson, or having to find an alternative means of educating their children.
a. General Accommodations
The 1950s saw an early case of public school accommodations, however, not for the
purpose of avoiding a certain lesson, but rather for receiving religious education. In Zorach v.
Clauson, the Court had to address whether a New York City program that allowed public schools
to release children for religious instruction during school hours violated the First Amendment. 105
To avoid any entanglement between church and state, students who participated in this program
left midday for religious instruction, thus no devotional teachings or exercises took place on school
grounds.106 Moreover, the religious institutions paid for all of the costs involved, thus no public
funds were ever used.107 Yet, even in trying to maintain strict separation, the plaintiffs who brought
this action consisted of New York City taxpayers and residents who argued that the schools
endorsed religious instruction through their cooperation in this program, and the release time of
the religious students halted regular classroom activities to the detriment of all the other
students.108 The Court affirmed the decision below, in holding the schools did not violate the
Establishment Clause because they “d[id] no more than accommodate their schedules to a program
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of outside religious instruction.”109 To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would mean holding
the Constitution requires “that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups.”110
However, when some circuit courts faced the question of whether accommodations should
be made for parents opposing certain curriculums years later, they declined to extend that same
reasoning. In Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Education, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had
to determine whether a school board violated the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights through mandating
a particular reading program. There, students from “born again Christian” families either
participated in an alternative reading program or were simply excused when their classes read
from, what some parents considered, a controversial assigned reader. 111 According to the objecting
parents, the reader included teachings of evolution, mental telepathy, magic, and false views of
death.112 However, shortly afterwards, the school board unanimously voted to eliminate any
alternative arrangements, and instead required every public school student to attend the reading
classes.113 While the district court found for the plaintiffs, the court of appeals reversed, finding
that “there was no proof that any plaintiff student was ever called upon to say or do anything that
required the student to affirm or deny a religious belief or to engage or refrain from engaging in
any act either required or forbidden by the student's religious convictions.”114 Furthermore, the
court attempted to distinguish this case from Yoder, in reasoning that in the latter, the parents
sought to remove their children from all modern society, while here, the parents send their children
to public schools in order to equip them for modern society.115 As a result, the court approached
the concerned parents with a “take it or leave it approach,” meaning that if they did not like the
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reading material in the public schools, they could send their children to private schools or simply
homeschool them.116
b. Specific Opt-Outs
In more recent years, parents have requested accommodations and opt-outs when their
children’s schools give lessons on traditionally known areas of controversy, such as sex education
and the LGBT movement.117 As with the request for general accommodations, courts addressing
opt-outs in these more specific situations have also been unwilling to find any First Amendment
violations.118 Specifically, the First Circuit has opined on two notable cases in these areas, in which
other courts have commonly cited.
In the 1995 case of Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., the plaintiffs, consisting of both
the students and their parents, sued multiple defendants from the students’ school as well as the
named defendant corporation because of an explicit mandatory school assembly presented by the
corporation.119 While the assembly was allegedly supposed to be a presentation on AIDS, it turned
out to be a performance of sexually provocative skits and messages, all involving members of the
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high school audience.120 According to the plaintiffs, the school failed to notify parents of the nature
of the program and failed to allow parents to excuse their children from attending the assembly.121
The court referred to Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder in holding against the Plaintiffs. In
distinguishing Meyer and Pierce, it held that while the former cases “involve[] the state proscribing
parents from educating their children, [this case] involve[d] parents prescribing what the state shall
teach their children.”122 Moreover, the court also reasoned that unlike in Yoder where the
compulsory attendance policy violated the Amish way of life, the one-time assembly here, by
contrast, could not be seen as also violating the Plaintiffs’ way of life. 123 Thus, the Plaintiffs could
not claim their Free Exercise rights had been infringed.124
Just over ten years later, the First Circuit opined on a case brought by parents of minor
children who claimed their school failed to allow the children to opt-out from reading books
promoting LGBT families. In Parker v. Hurley, two sets of parents sued their school board for
rejecting their requests to exempt a kindergartener and a second grader from reading books
contrary to their religious values.125 The first set of parents claimed their child’s school presented
him with books portraying same-sex families while both in kindergarten and in the first grade.126
Meanwhile, the second set of parents objected to their child’s second grade teacher reading “a
book that depicts and celebrates a gay marriage.”127 Notably, the parents did not object to these
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books as part of the school’s effort to promote nondiscrimination; rather, they objected to the
school refusing to give prior notice or allow for an exemption.128 Even more so, “[t]he parents
assert[ed] it is ironic, and unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause, for a public school
system to show such intolerance towards their own religious beliefs in the name of tolerance.” 129
The court held that the plaintiffs did not display an infringement on their constitutional
rights, even though it “accept[ed] as true plaintiffs' assertion that their sincerely held religious
beliefs were deeply offended.”130 Like the prior cases distinguishing Yoder, the court stated that
here, “the plaintiffs have chosen to place their children in public schools.”131 Moreover, while the
court did not go into a discussion of the Establishment Clause cases involving certain books in
public schools such as Schempp, it reasoned that in this case, “[r]equiring a student to read a
particular book is generally not coercive of free exercise rights.” 132 Since Parker and Brown,
subsequent federal courts have cited to these cases to further the notion that controversial teachings
in the classroom do not pose a threat to plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. 133
However, after the recent Free Exercise cases such as Fulton and Tandon, mentioned in
Section II, the Court may be more willing to conclude that curriculums such as those in Parker
and Brown amount to coercion as opposed to just “exposure” to ideas. A necessary prerequisite
for bringing a successful Free Exercise claim is a showing of coercion. 134 Smith-era cases such as
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Parker heavily stressed that the plaintiffs did not show coercion on the part of the government
because occasional exposure to religiously offensive concepts does not burden the parents nor
student.135 According to the court, these were generally applicable curriculums, which in Parker
and Brown, were not even formalized nor constantly imposed on the students. 136 However, with
the Supreme Court appearing to make its way back to strict scrutiny, coupled with new laws
mandating these controversial curriculums, as discussed in Section I, families might become more
likely to succeed when bringing Free Exercise claims.
SECTION IV: VOUCHERS AS A UNIQUE APPROACH TO ACCOMMODATIONS
As the preceding cases have shown, courts have been less willing to create opt-outs in
recent years for students who wish to be excused or otherwise accommodated for lessons that
violate their beliefs.137 Many courts cite to Yoder, not to accommodate other families but rather to
set the high threshold of what it takes to claim a violation under the First Amendment. These courts
have said more than once that because the plaintiffs choose to live in modern society, any issue
they have with their public schools can be remedied by finding an alternative method of schooling.
As a result, some parents have now asked for vouchers in order to afford alternate schooling.
a. Notable Supreme Court Voucher Cases
In recent decades, school voucher programs have been introduced not as a means for
students to avoid controversial school curriculums, but rather for low income students to have a
way to attend better schools that they otherwise would not be able to afford. Yet, even when the
goal of the voucher program is to provide a quality education to students who have ill-equipped
public schools, some have still sued claiming the private schools taking part in the program attempt
to violate the Establishment Clause.

135

Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
Id. at 106.
137 Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods.,
68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995); Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008).
136

26

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris became a landmark case on school vouchers in the early
twenty-first century. In the 1990s, the Cleveland public school district was called a “crisis that is
perhaps unprecedented in the history of American education.”138 As a result, a voucher program
emerged, which provided funds for families to either send their children to a different school of
their choice or to instead receive tutorial aid if they chose to remain in their public school.139
However, taxpayers argued the program advanced religion since a majority of the participating
schools were religiously affiliated.140 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the program was
one of “true private choice,” because any type of school could participate in an effort to better
educate Ohio students.141 Thus, the Court found no Establishment Clause violation and reversed
the decision below.142
Just last year, the Court faced another case on school vouchers in Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't
of Revenue. There, the plaintiffs brought suit arguing they could not use a scholarship from a
Montana tuition assistance program towards a religious school. 143 In fact, the Montana Supreme
Court struck down the entire program, “rel[ying] on the ‘no-aid’ provision of the State
Constitution, which prohibits any aid to a school controlled by a ‘church, sect, or
denomination.’”144 Citing Zelman, the Court found no Establishment Clause violation because “the
government support makes its way to religious schools only as a result of Montanans
independently choosing to spend their scholarships at such schools.”145 Moreover, the Court
further held that the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights had been violated because the state
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discriminated against the religious schools solely based on their religious status. 146 Notably, the
Court cited Pierce and Yoder in arguing that the no-aid provision infringed on the parental right
of directing their children’s upbringing in choosing what school they attend. 147 Thus, the Court
reversed the decision below.148
The Zelman decision stands for the notion that religious schools can be included in broad
voucher programs because as long as both religious and non-religious schools are included, the
program “is neutral in all respects toward religion,” thus making the program of “true private
choice.”149 Relying on Zelman, the Court in Espinoza went a step further in holding that if families
are permitted to use awarded scholarships towards private secular schools, then the religious status
of other private schools cannot bar families from using those scholarships there as well. While the
Montana Department of Revenue attempted to distinguish this case from Zelman in arguing that
the concern was how the funds would be used in the religious schools as opposed to simply the
religious status of those schools, the Court disagreed and found that this case involved
discrimination solely on the basis of status.150 However, the Court currently has an appeal pending
before it in the case of Carson v. Makin, in which it will now have to address the question of
“whether a state may nevertheless exclude families and schools based on the religious use to which
a student's aid might be put at a school.”151 If the Court continues the progression it began in
Zelman, families may be able to assert that even if a school will provide religious instruction,
sending one’s child there is still a matter of private choice, in which the government cannot bar
the use of aid. If the Court rules in favor of the plaintiffs, it would further expand Espinoza’s
holding from religious status to religious use. However, until Carson is decided, families may at
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least use government aid towards schools of religious status without fear of any Establishment
Clause violations.
b. Recent Voucher Initiatives and Other Suggested Accommodations
Today, not only are voucher programs seen as a possible solution to failing public
schools, but some also believe they are a means of dealing with mandated, controversial
curriculums. In New Jersey, some lawmakers proposed NJ A2407 in response to NJ S1569,
discussed earlier in this paper. NJ A2407, also known as the “Protecting Parental Involvement in
Curriculum Act,” sought to allow students to opt-out of lessons that involve “sex, sexuality, sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, conscience, ethics, morality, or religion.”152 In the event
the school refuses to permit students to opt-out, the bill sponsors asked the state to provide
“seventy-five percent of what was being taxed to support the [] child in the school system as a
voucher to send the child to a school of [the parents’] choice.”153 Although there have been over
ten thousand signatures from New Jersey parents who supported this effort, 154 the bill failed just
ten days after it was introduced.155 While the Act sought to provide a compromise between the
schools which choose to teach what they want and the parents who prefer to excuse their children
without affecting others, a member of Garden State Alliance involved in the LGBT curriculum
stated that the Act would allow “[a] white supremacist who is a denier of the Holocaust [to] pull
their child out of Holocaust studies.”156 It is unclear what concerned New Jersey families can do
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from here, but other states have proposed similar bills to combat controversial curriculums
throughout this past year.157
In our ever changing and polarized society, attempting to provide a curriculum that suits
all students may seem like a difficult task. However, these cases have shown that what the courts
consider controversial usually involve lessons on evolution and creation science, LGBT teachings,
and explicit sexual education. Thus, in making sure school boards do not open the floodgates to
suits by parents for anything they find controversial, the idea of “controversial curriculums” can
practically be limited to these three major topics. These topics involve fundamental ideas across
different religions and even to those without religion. In other words, beliefs across these topics
should be left to parents and guardians and not to school administrators, because the go to the very
heart of parental rights to child upbringing.
Ideally, public schools should refrain from treading controversial territory and avoid these
subjects. Just as schools cannot communicate religious teachings in a devotional way without
violating the Establishment Clause, schools should also not be able to teach anti-religious
teachings lest they violate the Free Exercise Clause. Stated differently, just as states cannot coerce
by endorsing religion, they also cannot coerce by opposing religion. Families are claiming that
their children’s schools are burdening their individual Free Exercise rights, and based on the
direction the Supreme Court appears to be heading, strict scrutiny will return as the operative
standard in which governments will find difficulty in proving that they are advancing their interests
in the least restrictive means possible.
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However, if the schools do not choose to maintain this neutrality in their curriculums, optouts would be the next best solution. In that case, each time a particular class or lesson involves a
controversial subject matter, students should be allowed an accommodation that would not
negatively impact their grade or attendance. Nonetheless, even the solution of opt-outs may prove
to be less helpful now, because in a state like New Jersey, LGBT teachings are to be implemented
across all subject areas and woven into the overall curriculum. Thus, it would be infeasible to have
students constantly opt-out of classes, and even having to do so for unexpected subjects like math.
Thus, if states adamantly want to go about teaching curriculums in this way, the only realistic
solution for concerned families becomes the voucher program.
Especially in states like New Jersey where much of property taxes fund public schools,
families should not have to resort to homeschooling their children. Instead, a voucher program
becomes the solution where public schools can teach what they choose but students who choose
to avoid certain curriculums can still receive a quality education with the tax money they already
pay.158 Like in Zelman and Espinoza, a voucher program should not only include religious schools,
but also secular schools as well. Moreover, the goal of these alternative schools should not be to
necessarily teach religion, but rather to teach a curriculum that is not against religion. In fact, if
the Court decides to equalize public schools with both secular and religious private schools through
a voucher program of this sort, parents would overall have more freedom in school choice. In other
words, vouchers would not necessarily only be utilized for controversial curriculums, but also
when parents may generally find their child’s public school unequipped to foster full academic
success—whether that may be due to the disadvantaged or failing nature of the school, the lack of
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The idea of sending students to different districts so that they have access to schools is no t a new concept, but
rather has been a remedy when districts have a shortage of schools. For example, Carson v. Makin, mentioned
above, involves multiple Maine school districts that do not operate their own public secondary schools, which is
why the state pays for students to attend nearby private schools. The specific question awaiting adjudication before
the Supreme Court is whether that program can include religiously affiliated private schools that will provide
religious instruction to the students. See Carson v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2020).
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catering to specific disabilities, or other possible reasons.159 However, if the goal of public schools
is to educate our students for a modern world, adhering to that focus on knowledge and not lifestyle
or debated beliefs is truly the way to welcome every type of student.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has spoken extensively on the separation of church and
state, especially in the context of public schools. Devotional teachings, prayer, and creation
theories have all been found unconstitutional in violation of the Establishment Clause, because
they express the State endorsing a particular belief, to the detriment of those students with
alternative beliefs. In the same way these practices have been struck down, all fundamental
teachings that endorse a belief contrary to multiple religions should be found unconstitutional as
well. Public schools should be inclusive institutions for all students across all backgrounds, but
administrators should focus on building educational knowledge, not proposing fundamental beliefs
meant for parents. In so doing, schools should refrain from endorsing controversial viewpoints in
the name of true equality, but if they refuse, the State should respect and support families who seek
alternate means of education through voucher programs. In adhering to the idea that “the State
may not adopt programs or practices in its public schools or colleges which ‘aid or oppose’ any
religion,”160 our governments will respect the true goal of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.
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